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PAYMENTS RESTRICTIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM*
Jay H. Levin**
The primary objective of any international-monetary system
should be to facilitate international trade and-capital-movements.
The proposition that countries gain mutually from free international trade was first estsblished by the classical economists as
a corollary of their theory of comparative advantage; The additional proposition that capital is most productive if it is free
to move from regions of low rates of return to regions of high
rates of return is a strong argument against-the-use of capital
controls. It would lead us too far astray here-to discuss these
propositins in detail. Let me simply say that most economists
are in broad agreement with them, and they can serve as useful
criteria with which to judge the success of any international
monetary system.
I believe that the lack of an automatic-balance-of payments
adjustment mechanism in the present-international-monetary system
fosters a strong tendency-for countries to adopt-restrictions on
international transactions. In this-way the-system'subverts its
own basic objectives. This argument-must begin-with-a description of the international'monetary-system devised-at.Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944,1 followed by a discussion of how
countries get into balance of payments difficulties and the options which the system affords for removing-payments-imbalances.
I will then demonstrate why countries-frequently-choose payments
restrictions as a method of balance of payments'adjustment.
I

THE INTERNATIONAL-MONETARY FUND-SYSTEM
The designers of the I.M.F. system believed-that-the primary
This article is based on a lecture delivered-at-the Cornell
Law School to the members of the-Cornell-International Legal Studies
Program on January 31, 1969.
Assistant Professor of Economics, Cornell University. B.A.
1964, University of Pittsburgh; M.A. 1966, Ph.D. 1968, Univ.of Michigar
1
PROCEEDINGS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS MONETARY AND
FINANCIAL CONF., PUBLICATION No. 2866; CONF. SER. NO. I, 3, (U. S.
Dept. State, 1948). For amendments; see'Hearings-on-S.10162 Before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1962
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objective of free trade and capital-movement,-would best be
served if countries maintained more-or less-fixedexchange rates
vis-a-vis each other for prolonged periods.It was'argued that
continuous fluctuations-in exchange-rates'inhibit'the'activities
of traders and investors by introducing-elements-of-risk into their
calculations.Under the-present system'governments are-obliged to
intervene-in the foreign exchange-market to prevent'fluctuations in
their currencies; 2 " For-example;-suppose'that-because of the activities of traders and investors more francs'are'supplied than are
demanded in the-foreign-exchange market'atthe-so.--called parity
price of 20 cents per franc. The price-of the-franc-would tend to
decline, and the French authorities-would-undertake-to purchase
tlis excess supply by selling-dollars in-exchange-for-francs.

Here

we have a case in which France is-faced-with a-balance'of payments
deficit; the supply of francs,-which reflects-French-demand for
imports and foreign investments-exceeds the-demand-for'francs,
which reflects the foreign-demand-for-French-exports:and.investments in France. The government must intervene-in-order to preserve the parity exchange value-of the-franc, and the-volume of
intervention-measures the-balance-of-payments-deficit;.:On the
other hand, if the private'demand-for-francs-exceeds-the:private
supply; the French authorities-can-only-prevent the-exchange'rate
of the franc from rising-by-sellingfrancs'in'the-foreign exchange market and acquiring dollars.
In the case of a balance-of payments deficit; the-authorities
surrender foreign exchange reserves; whereas'in-the-case of a
balance of payments surplus-they accumulate them; "In'addition to
foreign exchange, countries-also hold'gold as a-form-of'reserves.
The U. S. government agreed-to-fulfill-its-obligations to the
I.M.F. not by intervening'in-the exchange markets'but'by selling
gold to and buying gold from foreign-authorities-at'thirty-five
dollars an ounce. Occasionally-countrieswith-a-balance-of payments
deficit sell gold to the-United-States-in-order-to~acquire dollars
with which they can-finance-their deficit.
Thus, the system is characterized-by-official-ownership of
2
The particular governmental agency-responsible-for exchange
market intervention will'be'the central bank; the'treasury, or an
exchange equalization account.
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ddlars and gold (and to a-lesser extent-British-sterling) as
foreign exchange reserves; The-function of-these-reserves is.to
finance balance of payments deficits that-are-believed:to.be temporary. New reserves aregenerated-whenever the-U;:"S-;balance of
payments is in deficit--foreign-central-banks'are'obliged to-prevent their exchange rates from rising-in-relation-to-the dollar
by buying up the excess dollars-in-the exchange-market. Prior
to March 1968 central banks also-acquired gold-whenever thepriHowever,
vate supply exceeded the private-demand-at-$35-an'ounce;
central banks no longer intervene-in the'gold-markets; and as of
now gold is not a source-of-reserve growth.
A final characteristic of the'I.M:F;-system-is-that-countries are permitted to-occasionally alter-their-exchange:rates
whenever their payments-imbalances-appear-to-be-chronic,-a sit3
uation which the I.M.F. describes as'"fundamental disequilibrium."
However, frequent changes in-exchange rates'are'notenvisioned as
they would undermine the presumed-benefits-of-fixed-exchange rates.
II
CAUSES-OF-PAYMENTS IMBALANCE

It is only natural that balance of-payments-deficits.and
surpluses arise from time to time,

-Countries-differ-in the de-

gree to which they are-willing to-tolerate'inflation-or the-speed
at which they can eliminate inflationary-pressures;-and the resulting diverse movements-in-price levels-will-create-deficits for
the countries inflating most-rapidly-and-surpluses for the-countries with lower or zero rates-of-inflation;--Another:cause.of
payments imbalance is that countries-undergo-different rates or
types of structural change.- For-example;'technological progress
may proceed in spurts in some countries-and-lag-in-others, or
there may be secular shifts-in taste-patterns-or-demands for foreign assets.

These structural'changes are-bound-to'have an im-

pact on the volume and pattern-of-each country~s-international
trade and capital flows, and-the natural-consequence-is-a-payments imbalance.

This is not-to say that-payments-imbalances are

always undesirable.
3

For-example,-when the-United States is running

published in UNITEDNATIONSMONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONFERENCE: FINAL ACT AND RELATED'DOCUMENTS; PUBLICATION NO. 2187, CONF.
SER.NO. 55 (U. S. Dept. State), T.I.A.S. No. 1501 (1945).
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a payments deficit, foreign-central banks are-acquiring:additional
stocks of dollar reserves.

These additionsmay'be-desirable to

permit them-to finance-future-balance-of-payments-deficits, which
we should expect to increase'in magnitude-in-a-growing world
economy. On the other hand; the U; S;,deficitmay-be'so large
that surplus countries are acquiring-reserves-more-quickly than
they desire. -There-is-indeed-a-substantial-cost'involved in running
a sizable balance of payments-surplus; for-a'surplus-country is
foregoing the acquisition-of otherwiseavailable-additional goods
and services. By increasing its-imports-or-reducing-its exports
the surplus country can-increase'its-welfare-as-it'eliminates its
However; there-may-even be
balance of payments disequilibrium;z
more pressure for a balance-of payments-deficit-country to take
steps to remove its payments imbalance;,°For'example;'a persistent
French balance of payments-deficit-is not tolerable-indefinitely
since the deficit must be-financed-by'the-drawing-down-of official
reserves. The cumulative'deficit-obviously-cannot-exceed.the
country's stock of reserves, and-eventually-the-deficit country
will be forced to take action.
III
-BALANCE

OF PAYMENTS'ADJUSTMENT'ALTERNATIVES

There are essentially three methods-of adjustment to restore
payments balance: variations-ininternal-deman; changes in exchange rates; and changes-in-restrictions-on-international transactions. I will discuss-these-in-order-from the-point of view of
a deficit country.
A.

Variations in Internal'Demand

A deficit can be-removed-by a'sufficient-reduction of internal aggregate demand. Governmentexpenditures-may'be decreased,
income taxes may be raised; or the-central~bankmay'undertake to
Because
restrict the supply of credit andraise-interest-rates;
industrialized countries are'characterized'by-a'downward inflexibility of wages 4 these actions tend-to-reduce the-level of output and employment, and'consequently-the-demand'for-imports will
4

Downward wage inflexibility may stem from-trade union pressures, minimum wage laws,'or even-employers'-reluctance to cut
wages.
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decline. To the extent that prices also decline, consumers have
an e~an greater incentive to switch their purchases away from foreign goods, and foreigners will be induced to purchase more of the
muntry's exports. In short this method of adjustment takes the
form of reduced imports and increased exports that accompany
deflation. The extent of the initial balance-of payments deficit
determines the required degree of deflation. Deficit countries
have occasionally resorted to this type of adjustment. British
policy prior to the November 1967 devaluation is a conspicuous
example of internal belt-tightening for balance of payments reasons. 5 The claim has frequently been made that prior to the 1964
tax cut U. S. policy-makers were reluctant to reduce the-high level
of unemployment for fear of aggravating the balance of payments
deficit. 6 I think it can be safely said, however,that the deflationary cure is worse than the disease. Deliberately created unemployment is socially intolerable, politically dangerous, and
clearly a waste of economic resources.
B.

Changes in Exchange Rates

A second alternative from the standpoint of a deficit
country is a devaluation of the currency, i.e., reducing the price
of the home currency in terms of foreign currencies. At the lower
foreign exchange rate the countryls'exports become more attractive to foreigners, and imports become more expensive to domestic residents. These price effects normally work to improve the
balance of payments, and an appropriate devaluation will restore
balance of payments equilibrium.7 Mention should be made of the
fact that along with the devaluation the government must also
take measures to cushion the devaluation's stimulatory effects
5

For a discussion of recent British balance of payments policy,
see R. N. Cooper, The Balance of Payments. BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC
PROSPECTS 147-97 (--8T.
6
See Goldstein, Does It Necessarily Cost Anything to
be the
World Banker, 2 NAT'L BANK.REV. 411-15 (19).
7
Thi paper does not attempt to answer the question of whether
periodic exchange rate changes are more, or less, desirable than
the continuous changes provided by a freely fluctuating rate system. On this question of the optimum timing of adjustment and
related matters, see M. FRIEDMAN, The Case for Flexible Exchange
Rates, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 157-203 (1959).
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on the economy, which would otherwise counteract the favorable
balance of payments effects.

Devaluation can-succeed only if it

is accompanied by appropriate macro-economic policies, such as
increased taxation or reduced government expenditures, But I
wish to stress that the major problem with the devaluation alternative is the reluctance of the authorities to make use of it.
Devaluation is often regarded in official circles as a major political catastrophe. It is viewed as a disaster to the country's
financial prestige and a threat to future confidence in its currency. Witness the recent refusal of the French to undertake a
change in the par value of the franc.

It also may be noted.here

that surplus countries resist making upward changes in their exchange rates because appreciation induces resources to leave export industries and industries that compete with imports.

This

essentially mercantilist attitude 8 on the part of surplus countries
and the refusal to swallow their pride on the part of the governments of deficit countries is in my view largely responsible for
the recourse to yet a third method of balance of payments adjustment:
C.

restrictions on international transactions.

Changes in Restrictions on International'Transactions
It is of course ironic that deficit countries opt for re-

strictions wheA the very objective of the system is to facilitate
internatioal trade and capital movements. The widespread use of
restrictions undertaken for balance of payments reasons can be
well documented. During the November 1968 exchange crisis the
British government imposed the requirement on-importers that they
make deposits with the customs houses equal to 50 percent

of

the value of all manufactured imports and certain other categories of imports. 9 The total covers about one-third of Great
Britain's imports. The deposits will be returnable in six months
without interest, and the legislation is to be in effect for a
maximum of 12 months. The intended effect is to restrict the supply
and to raise the domestic price of imported goods with the consequence of a decline in imports and improvement in the balance
8This refers to the belief originating in the sixteenth century that measures undertaken to enlarge a balance of trade surplus are sure ways of increasing a nation's wealth.
9
See 20 INTIL FIN. NEWS SURVEY, Dec. 6, 1968 at 405 (1968).
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Again, in the November 1 9 64"crisis the British
reacted by imposing a direct surcharge of 15 percent-on imports
of most manufactured goods, which eventually-was eliminated two
years later. The surcharge provoked-strong protests-abroad, especially from other members of the European-Free Trade Area, who
of payments.

felt that much of the-gain from tariff reduction that-previously
had taken place within EFTAwould be destroyed.
In the case of the United States a number-of restrictions can
be pointed to. For example, in July-1963 the-U: S;-adopted the
so-called interest Equalization Tax, a 15 percent-tax on purchases of long-term foreign securities-designed to-reduce capital
The tax is still in effect. 10. More recently the government has introduced mandatory restrictions on direct investments
11
by corporations in all foreign areas,
and the-F(deral.Reserve
System maintains voluntary ceilings on foreign-lending by banks
and other financial institutions 1 2 and-has standby authority to
outflows.

invoke mandatory controls. Last-year the administration proposed
severe restrictions on foreign travel, but-fortunately these
failed to receive Congressional support. It has even been
asserted that the restrictive Japanese import quotas were originally undertaken as an escape from balance of payments difficulties. 1 3 These in no way violated the spirit-of the GATT
agreements, which endorse quantitative restrictions 1 4 on imports
when countries encounter severe balance of payments problems.
10

For acquisitions of stock on or before-January 25; 1967,.
the tax on the transfer of stock was 15 percent-of the stocks'
actual value. For acquisitions after January 25, 1967 through
August 29, 1967, the tax was 22.5 percent of the stocks' actual
ilue. The tax on the transfer of stock made-after-April 4, 1969
is 11.25 percent of the stocks' actual value. The President, by
Executive Order No. 11464 dated April 3, 1969, adjusted the rates
to their present level. These rates will remain in-effect until
such time as the President deems a rate change necessary. Code
Sec. 4911(b) authorizes the President to vary the-rates from zero
to a maximum of 22.5 percent. CCA FED. EXCISE TAXREP. 3193,
at 3169-8 (1969).
llRestraints, Export Drive Included in Payments Program, 74
INT'L COM1 . 5 (1968).
12
See 55 FED. RES. BULL. 11 (1969).
13
See BUS. WEEK Jan. 4, 1969, at 65.
14 Article XII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
61 Stet. pt. 5, A3 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700 55 U.NoT.S. 194

(1950).
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The objection to all trade restrictions is that they are
selective and inefficient.

By their very nature they discriminate

against.some sectors of the economy in favor of others by distorting the structure of prices; consequently they result in a
nisallocation of resources. In the case of capital controls the
benefits from freely mobile capital are foregone. It would be
far preferable to avoid additional restrictions by the deficit
countries by encouraging the surplus countries to adjust by
unilaterally liberalizing their payments restrictions. Unfortunately, the solution appears to be politically impractical.
Countries desire "concessions" from others as an inducement to
relax their own restrictions.

Accordingly, there appears to be

little hope for balance of payments adjustment by this route.
CONCLUSION
I am forced to conclude that we are faced with too many
economic objectives that cannot be fulfilled simultaneously.
Ideally, countries want to maintain full employment, fixed exchange rates, and freedom of international payments. But when they
get into balance of payments difficulties, one of these goals
eventually must be sacrificed.

The clear and present danger is

that restrictions will be preferred, and these undermine the basic
objective of the monetary system. Proponents of more flexibility
in exchange rates have in mind a mechaniam which automatically
eliminates payments imbalances and averts the necessity for restrictions.

The real question is whether we are willing to view

exchange rates as a means and not as an end of economic policy.
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